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Abstract 
In genomic research, cohort and large-scale population studies are proliferating along 
with accompanying infrastructures (databases and biobanks). Population-based 
research links samples and data from multiple sources often obtained for other 
purposes. The normative frameworks of many countries are largely based on 1980 
OECD principles which limit the uses of personal data, especially for secondary 
purposes. These limits, now found in legislation, policies and research guidelines, 
pose major barriers to population-based research.  
 
This text examines similarities and differences between epidemiology, public health 
research and genomics. It also distinguishes between primary and secondary uses of 
personal information. In a comparative and critical analysis of the normative 
landscapes of five countries, Québec (Canada), Germany, Australia, the United States 
and the United Kingdom, three barriers are identified:  the impracticability of re-
consent; the shortcomings of the review process (ethics and privacy) and certain 
multi-jurisdictional issues. Recommendations are proposed. 
Introduction 
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, epidemiologists demonstrated the correlation 
between lung diseases and asbestos exposure. Their discoveries improved both the 
conditions of thousand of workers and construction practices. Such population-based 
projects2 could not have been done in the current normative landscape. The main 
reasons are the obligations to seek specific individual consent and to obtain approval 
from review boards (privacy and ethics) in each institution where medical records are 
to be accessed.  
 
Recently, certain authors3 have concluded that an adapted ethical framework was 
needed for population-based research, since the current framework is unable to 
address the questions of the “public good” associated with the goals and methods of 
longitudinal epidemiology. This paper, while not engaging in this debate, aims to 
provide some critical reflection. In an era where cohort and large-scale population 
studies are emerging alongside research infrastructures (databases and biobanks), it is 
necessary to re-examine applicable normative frameworks. 
 
This text focuses on why population-based research is challenging current ethical and 
legal frameworks. In the first part, the similarities and differences between 
epidemiology, public health research and genomic research are highlighted. The 
second part begins with the distinction between primary and secondary access to 
personal data. A comparative and critical analysis of the multi-jurisdiction normative 
landscapes in Canada, Germany, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom 
follows, focusing on common difficulties and on the innovative solutions proposed for 
population research. Three major barriers are identified: 1) the multi-jurisdictional 
nature of a federated country; 2) the impracticability of re-consent; and 3) the 
            Genomics, Society and Policy 
             2009, Vol.5, No.1, pp.80-99 
 
_____________   
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.5, No.1 (2009) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© ESRC Genomics Network. 
  
81
shortcomings of review boards (ethics / privacy) in the evaluation of population-based 
research. In the third part, specific recommendations for future guidance in the 
evaluation of population research are proposed. 
PART I  Population Research 
i) Similarities and distinctions 
Population-based research (or population research) refers to research on human 
subjects where “the objectives aim to improve the health of populations and discover 
interventions that raise the baseline health status of entire communities. This term is 
used in contrast to “disease-based research”, whose goal is to ameliorate or cure a 
particular disease, regardless of its membership in a particular community.”4 A key 
feature of population research is the identification of risk factors. Population research 
is based on observational studies and comparisons of disease rates. It includes socio-
economic and environmental data, as health determinants, to characterize the 
population under study. The parameters may be a disease rate, the prevalence of an 
exposure, or some measure of association between exposure and disease. The sample 
is generally large (enough to be statistically representative of the target population) 
and the data often collected by a multitude of researchers, in many institutions and 
countries (to compare populations). Box 1 proposes a comparison of population 
research and disease-oriented research. 
 
 
Box 1: Distinctive characteristics of population-based research and disease-based research 
 
 Population-based Research Disease-based Research 
Objectives Improve health of population 
Discover interventions to raise health 
status 
Treat or cure specific disease with 
techniques or products 
Focus Oriented to groups, communities, 
populations 
Oriented to individuals and families 
regardless of where they live or under 
what conditions 
Key feature Identify risk factors Characterize diseases 
Methods Observational studies,  
Association studies, comparisons of 
disease rates and exposures 





Included as health determinants to 
characterize the population at study 
Excluded; individuals are enrolled 
regardless of where they live or under 
what conditions 
Sample size Large enough to be representative of 
the target population. 
Relatively small, variable according to the 
parameters of the study 
Source of data Multiple in kind of data (socio-demo-
econo-environmental data) 
Multiple in source (professionals, 
institutions, regions, countries) 
Specific 
Local, national, international 
Time scale May be longitudinal Generally limited in time 
 
Population research is not a scientific discipline per se. Scientists who design 
population-research projects are mostly epidemiologists working in different fields of 
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medicine and biological sciences. In consequence, the methods and parameters of 
population research are largely those of epidemiology.5  
 
An important aspect of epidemiology needs to be distinguished. The tasks of 
monitoring and surveillance for public health practice6 are part of epidemiology. 
These may employ research activities in their methods, but refer to different 
imperatives, such as emergency and targeted public health interventions, based on 
evidence of effectiveness. 
 
Once population research is defined, further distinctions can be made regarding two of 
its fields: public health research and genomic research. Both are subject to ethical 
issues7. Public health research may be associated with a specific context, where 
intervention by public authorities (e.g. the government’s department of health) is 
necessary. Its objectives are those generally attributed to public health - protection, 
disease prevention, health promotion, usually defined in legislation with specific and 
special powers of action.  Research in public health is directed to problematic aspects 
of population health and consequently researchers will use health determinants 
derived from personal information to characterize a problem and to propose 
interventions. In contrast, genomic research aims to associate genetic determinants 
with specific conditions of health or diseases. It focuses on gene regulation, 
expression and interaction among genes and environmental factors. Its data are 
genetic and personal and come from multiple sources. Its tools are research 
infrastructures such as biobanks and databases. Box 2 summarizes the characteristics 
of these two types of population-based research. 
 
 
Box 2 : Distinctive characteristics of two types of population-based research 
 
 Public Health Research Genomic Research 
Objectives Protection, prevention, promotion 
of population health 
Knowledge of gene-gene and gene-
environmental factors in the 
population 
Results Targeted interventions based on 
scientific evidence 
Discovery of targets, therapeutic 
applications, lifestyle modifications 
Nature of data Health determinants Genetic and personal data 
Special tools Legislative powers, governmental 
facilities 
Biobanks and databases for research 
 
Thus, population research has three specific features: the linkage of multiple types of 
data (clinical, socioeconomic, demographic, lifestyle, behavioral and environmental 
health determinants8) from multiple sources (registries, medical records, 
governmental databases, institutions, countries) and the procurement of a large 
number of samples (in databases and biobanks).  
PART II.  Comparative Analysis 
The logic of the legal framework in Canada has its origins in the 1980 OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.9 In 
these fundamental guidelines, protection of personal data refers to a series of 
principles that govern all aspects of the “life cycle” of data, notably: collection, usage, 
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 Primary use is determined at the moment of collection 
 Secondary use must be in accordance with 
1) the primary use agreed at the initial consent, or 
2) a specific consent sought for the new purpose, or  
3) authorized by law. 
access and destruction. These principles are considered “as minimum standards which 
are capable of being supplemented by additional measures for the protection of 
privacy and individual liberties.”10 They have been integrated into the provincial and 
federal laws of both Canada and of the OECD member countries.  
Two of the principles are particularly relevant to the secondary use of personal data in 
a research context:  
 
Para 9   Purpose Specification Principle 
The purposes for which personal data are collected should be  
specified n ot la ter th an at the time of  data  collection  and th e 
subsequent use lim ited to the f ulfilment of those purposes or such 
others as are not incompatible with those pu rposes and  as are 
specified on each occasion of change of purpose.11 
 
Para 10  Use Limitation Principle 
Personal data should not be disclo sed, made available or otherwise 
used for purposes oth er than thos e specified in acco rdance with 
Paragraph 9 except: a) with the consent of the data subject; or b) by 
the authority of law.12 
 
Paragraph 9 indicates that the possible uses of personal data should be defined at the 
moment of the collection of data, and the subsequent use (“primary use”) should be 
limited to these purposes. It also foresees potential “other” uses (“secondary uses”), 
which would not be incompatible with the specified primary use and which would be 
referred on each occasion of change to the relevant authority (e.g. privacy/ethics 
board) to evaluate their compatibility with the purposes initially specified. Paragraph 
10 specifies that access or uses should logically be in accordance with the purposes 
previously defined, but allows two exceptions that could permit different uses of 
personal data: the consent of the data subject or an authorization by law.  
 
In a number of countries, the multiplication of jurisdictions (e.g.provincial, federal) 
creates additional difficulties for multi-site projects. Population research can involve 
studies across multiple institutions, 
jurisdictions and countries. This 
affects the obligation of legislative 
compliance for researchers on 
different levels. In this second Part 
Québec, the normative frameworks 
of (Canada), Germany, Australia, 
the UK and the USA will be described and critiqued, putting emphasis on the 
obstacles facing population research.  
ii) Québec - Canada 
The principles of the OECD are translated in the Acts regarding personal data in both 
the public and private sectors in Québec and in the applicable federal laws of Canada. 
Uses of personal information are restricted in all these laws.13 It is clearly specified 
that any further use, different from the initial purpose, must be in accordance with 
consent or by law. However, studies, research and statistics activities benefit from a 
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specific provision that stipulates that such uses of personal information are possible 
without consent.14 Research then is considered as a “compatible secondary use” of 
personal information.15 Access must be authorized by a privacy board (e.g. Access 
Commission in Québec)16 and requests will be evaluated according to two criteria: the 
necessity of nominative personal information for the activity and the confidentiality 
measures to protect the information.17 Authorization is granted for a limited period 
and information must be destroyed at the end of the project. 
Interestingly, the Canadian federal legislation for the private sector introduced a third 
criterion: the “impracticability to obtain consent”. There is no such mention in the 
federal Privacy Act for public bodies, nor in the Québec legislation. The Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research refined this criterion in their Best Practices for 
Protecting Privacy in Health Research: “Seeking consent from individuals for the use 
of their personal data may be considered impracticable when there are difficulties in 
contacting or notifying individuals for reasons such as: the size of the population 
being researched; the proportion of prospective participants likely to have relocated or 
died since the time the personal information was originally collected; or the lack of an 
existing or continuing relationship between prospective participants and the data 
holder who would need to contact them (e.g. a patient database that does not have a 
regular follow-up program to maintain a complete and accurate record of changes in 
registrants' contact information over time); such that: there is a risk of introducing 
bias into the research because of the loss of data from segments of the population that 
cannot be contacted to seek their consent, thereby affecting the validity of results 
and/or defeating the purpose of the study; or the additional financial, material, human, 
organizational and other resources needed to obtain consent could impose a hardship 
or burden on the researchers or organization so burdensome that the research could 
not be done”.18 
As concerns medical records in health establishments in Québec, the same logic of 
restricted use and specific consent applies under statute.19 But, the director of 
professional services may waive the obligation of consent and approve access requests 
for study, teaching or research purposes, if the criteria of the Access Commission are 
met (necessity and confidentiality) and if the project is in accordance with “accepted 
standards of ethics or scientific integrity”.20 A specific approval of an ethics 
committee21 is therefore necessary. These standards consist of a plethora of norms, 
the most important in Canada being the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical 
Conduct for Research Involving Humans.22 According to the Statement, “Secondary 
use of data refers to the use in research of data contained in records collected for a 
purpose other than the research itself. Common examples are patient or school records 
or biological specimens, originally produced for therapeutic or educational purpos
but now proposed for use in research. This issue becomes of concern only when data
can be linked to individuals, and becomes critical when the possibility exists that 
individuals can be identified in the published reports.”23 The Statement offers no 
guidance for longitudinal, epidemiological or biobanking endeavours.24 Currently 
under revision, the new draft Statement proposes that ethics approval “does not appl
to secondary use of information that is anonymous, anonymized or de-
identified/coded and where the research team has no access to the code. For example, 
this article [ethics approval for secondary use] does not apply to a researcher who 
            Genomics, Society and Policy 
             2009, Vol.5, No.1, pp.80-99 
 
_____________   
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.5, No.1 (2009) ISSN: 1746-5354 














portance of the principle of proportionality with regard 
ions 
option. It is also interesting to note that the German Council has stated that “It is in 
receives a de-identified dataset from an organization, but who does not have a
a code that permits re-identificati 25
In the provinces of Ontario and Alberta, ethics committees studying requests for 
secondary uses have an additional criterion: balancing the public interest. In the case 
of Ontario, the public interest is associated with the necessity criterion or the 
anticipated public or scientific benefit of the research.26 In Alberta, ethics review 
boards have to balance the necessity (access to health information for research) with 
confidentiality (protection of privacy) in order to determine if the first “outweighs to a 
substantial degree”27 the second. Alberta legislation provides further helpful criteria: 
the research ethics board must consider the degree to which the proposed research 
may contribute to (a) identification, prevention or treatment of illness or disease, (b) 
scientific understanding relating to health, (c) promotion and protection of the health 
of individuals and communities, (d) improved delivery of health services, or (e) 
improvements in health system management.28 
As mentioned by the Québec Advisory Group on Governance of Databanks and 
Biobanks used for Health Research, the normative framework is not well adapted to 
the reality of research with databases where multiple projects may be carried out over 
an undetermined period of time.29 Therefore, a strict interpretation of the 
requirements for secondary uses would stop research projects in epidemiology, in 
both public health and genomics. For these reasons, the Québec Advisory Group has 
recommended the modification of relevant legislation.30 In addition, the variability
understanding among and interpretation by ethics review boards imposes enormou
burdens for multi-site research projects, to say nothing of international collaborativ
ii) Germany 
In Germany, freedom of research is guaranteed, among other basic human rights, by 
constitutional law31 but, as in other countries, it must conform to different privacy an
confidentiality rules. The most important pieces of legislation are the Federal Data 
Protecti
states.  
The FDPA stipulates that personal data obtained for scientific purposes have to
rendered anonymous as soon as possible.32 Any processing of personal data is 
possible if the following cumulative conditions are met: the processing has to be 
necessary for the conduct of scientific research; the interest in the research has to 
outweigh significantly the interests of the data subject with regard to the change of th
purpose; and the purpose of research could not be achieved by other means w
unreasonable expenditure or indeed at all.33 By creating these conditions the 
legislators emphasized the im
to the change of purpose.34 
For its part, the German National Ethics Council suggested a declaration of consent 
containing options so as to respect the autonomy of people participating in research 
more directly.35 It also attenuated some limitations on consent36 by proposing opt
as to duration (e.g. five or 10 years) and the nature of research (e.g. only for this 
project; all research on cancer; all health research), allowing broad consent as an 
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the public interest for biobanks to be available for medical research. They should 
therefore be at the disposal of as large a group of interested researchers as possible.”37  
Recognizing that research rarely benefits an individual per se, but only as a member 
of a specific group or as a carrier of particular characteristics, but taking for granted 
that researchers often need individual data (microdata) to start with, the Berlin Data 
Protection Commissioner proposed a way to mitigate the accumulation of conditions 
on privacy and confidentiality.38 He proposed to introduce a legally protected 
“research secret” analagous to medical secrecy in the German Criminal Code.39 He 
argued that combined with “pseudonymisation” of data (i.e. coding), such a research 
secret could be an appropriate measure to protect personal information. This has also 
been proposed in the Telematic Platform for Medical Research Networks report.40 
iii) Australia 
In Australia, similar to other federations, the process of compliance with legislation 
and guidelines on data protection is complex. The National Health and Medical 
Research Council (NHMRC) expressed the view that:  
“The curren t state of privacy  reg ulation in  Australia is  entire ly 
unsatisfactory. Its complexity is impacting on the proper provision of 
health care and the conduct of important health and m edical 
research, in addition to creating significant unnecessary compliance 
costs.”41 
The Commonwealth Privacy Act42 (Privacy Act), enacted in 1988, provides the 
regulatory framework for the protection of personal information in all national States. 
Its application was extended to the private sector in 2000, and in particular to the 
collection, use and disclosure of health information. It thus applies to many fields, 
including health and human research. Most Australian States have enacted legislation 
on privacy43 or health information protection.44 
 
The Privacy Act proposes a “public interest test” with criteria that a Human Research 
Ethics Committee (HREC) must apply to health research: 
the value and public importance of the research; 
the likely benefits of the participation; 
whether the research design can be modified; 
the financial costs of not proceeding with the research; 
the type of personal information being sought; 
the risk of harm to individuals, and 
the extent of a possible breach of privacy.45 
It is important to note that the current definition accompanying the above test states 
that the public interest of research must “substantially outweigh”46 the public interest 
in the protection of privacy. This has led to HRECs taking a conservative approach in 
their reviews of research projects.47 Some authors consider that the trade-off between 
public good and privacy is doing more harm than good.48 Another, with irony, asked 
whether “the time has come for Australia to have public interest commissioners who 
can powerfully advocate for the public interest in high-quality health research”.49 
With this perspective in mind, the NHMRC recently adopted new guidelines.50 The 
most interesting principle of these is the provision on “future use of data and tissue in 
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research” which may be specific, extended (closely related or in the area of the 
original project) or unspecified (any future research).51 Provision 2.2.18 stipulates that 
access is conditional on consent, but consent can be waived by the ethics committee.  
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) is currently reviewing the 
Australian privacy laws so as to make recommendations.52 Protection of health 
information and research with personal information are an important part of the 
consultation. The proposed “research exception” to the use and disclosure of personal 
information53 includes considering: a) the “necessity for research”, which includes 
activity preliminary to research such as the creation of databases;54 b) the 
“impracticability of seeking individual consent”, which means more than incurring 
some expense or effort. The obstacles must be real and they must be significant;55  
c) the “HREC’s review and its satisfaction that the public interest outweighs the 
public interest in maintaining the privacy protection”: the ALRC has attenuated the 
public interest balance by deleting the word “substantially”; d) the “conformity with 
the rules issued by the Privacy Commissioner”, which has been asked, among others, 
to provide guidance on “not reasonably identifiable” criteria related to personal 
information;56 and e) ”a reasonable belief that the recipient of the information will not 
disclose the personal information in a form that would identify the individual or from 
which the individual would be reasonably identifiable”. 
One of the main goals of this initiative is to harmonize State and Federal law, in both 
the private and public sectors, in order to achieve national consistency. The final 
report and recommendations were delivered to the Attorney-General in May 2008.57 
iv)  United States58 
In the US, the Privacy Rule59, a Federal regulation under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, protects certain health 
information in entities covered by the Rule.60 Also known as the Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, the Privacy Rule was adopted 
to protect the privacy of health information that identifies individuals, whether living 
or deceased (called Protected Health Information - PHI). In general, the Privacy Rule 
overrides State laws regulating the privacy of health information but if they are not 
contrary to a provision of the Privacy Rule, both remain in full force and effect, so 
that covered entities will have to follow State laws in addition to the Privacy Rule. 
 It is important to emphasize that the Privacy Rule does not apply to research per se; it 
applies to covered entities (e.g. health care providers or clearinghouse), which may or 
may not include researchers. The Rule may affect researcher access to information, 
but it does not regulate the research directly. The decision whether an individual 
researcher must comply with the Privacy Rule is a fact-sensitive decision determined 
on a case by case basis. 
Within the frame of the Privacy Rule, either individual research subjects give their 
consent to the use of personal data, or the REB or the Privacy Board61 waives the 
requirement of consent and gives an authorization to access the data without it. When 
an authorization is obtained for research purposes, the Privacy Rule requires that it be 
used only for that specific research study, and not for nonspecific research or for 
future and unspecified projects. It is also possible to have access to a limited data set 
            Genomics, Society and Policy 
             2009, Vol.5, No.1, pp.80-99 
 
_____________   
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.5, No.1 (2009) ISSN: 1746-5354 





without obtaining an authorization, by signing a data use agreement with the entities 
concerned, which establishes conditions on which researchers can use the data.  
It is interesting to underline that de-identified health information is exempt from the 
Privacy Rule. According to the Rule, to de-identify health information, 18 data 
elements including ZIP codes, ages and dates, must be removed. Designed to 
encourage researchers to use de-identified information, the standard appears 
unsuitable for much epidemiological, health services and other population-based 
research.62 A Data Use Agreement for accessing a limited data set is the way to solve 
this difficulty; but since it deals with information deprived of identifiers, even if their 
number is minimal, it may not adequately suit the research purposes. Finally, to limit 
certain uses or disclosures of personal health information, including those for research 
purposes, to “the information reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose”, the 
Privacy Rule imposes a minimum necessary requirement on all permitted uses and 
disclosures of personal health information by a covered entity.  
Most of the biomedical and behavioral research conducted in the United States is 
governed either by the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (also 
known as the “Common Rule”)63 and/or the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
Protection of Human Subjects Regulations.64 Some authors have questioned the 
pertinence and the public gains of the Privacy Rule when research is already regulated 
by the federal Common Rule,65 which is designed to find a balance between 
legitimate concerns about privacy and the regulatory burdens on medical record 
research.66 Moreover, there is a major difference between the two rules: the 
“Common Rule addresses the overall welfare of interest of research subjects, wher
the HIPAA regulations pertain only to research subjects’ privacy in 67
A ‘Certificate of Confidentiality’ is another means to provide access and protect 
identifiable health information. They are granted by the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the FDA and other 
Federal agencies, for “studies that collect information which, if disclosed, could 
damage subjects’ financial standing, employability, insurability, or reputation, or have 
other adverse consequences”. Certificates of Confidentiality help to achieve research 
objectives and promote participation in research studies by protecting researchers and 
institutions from forced disclosure of such information. 
This system in the USA has come under further criticism. In a survey of a large group 
of US epidemiologists regarding the influence of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on their 
research, two-thirds thought the rule had made research more difficult and a majority 
thought the rule had a negative effect on the protection of human subjects.68 Others 
have reported that the effect of the HIPAA is to discourage legitimate low-risk 
research, citing a 70% reduction in medical records research requiring ethics review in 
the first year of the HIPAA Rule.69 The Rule has also been criticized for creating bias, 
thereby undermining the validity of research results in patient registries.70 Finally, 
according to others, the major threat to the present system is the dysfunctional nature 
of ethics review.71 The American Medical Informatics Association has published a 
‘white paper’ asking for a “national framework for secondary use of health data”.72 
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v)  United Kingdom 
Research in the UK is guided by an array of intersecting limitations, each deriving its 
authority from different ethical, legal and policy sources. The resulting situation is 
“complicated”.73 
The most important laws governing medical research using personal data are: the Data 
Protection Act 1998 (DPA), the common law on confidentiality, the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (HRA)74 and Section 60 of the Health and Social Care Act 2001.75 In the 
late 1990’s the confusion surrounding the DPA, HRA and common law of 
confidentiality forced research ethics committees and hospitals to adopt a 
conservative interpretation of the law; they were reluctant to support studies based on 
the use of identifiable personal data.76 Section 60 of the Health and Social Care Act 
2001 was enacted in response to this situation, to allow organizations to obtain 
patients’ identifiable information gathered for medical purposes in circumstances 
where it was impracticable to obtain informed consent from the patients concerned.77 
This Act sets aside the common law duty of confidentiality for the use of medical 
records for specific purposes.  Paragraphs 1 and 10 of Section 60 associate medical 
research with the public interest.78 
For its part, Section 33 of the DPA provides a limited exemption for research and 
statistical purposes. The further processing of personal data for these purposes is not 
to be considered incompatible with the purposes for which the data were obtained,79 
provided that it will not support measures or decisions with respect to particular 
individuals and the processing is not likely to cause substantial damage or distress to 
any data subjects. According to section 2 of the Act, which associates health 
information with sensitive data, the processing of this information for research 
purposes must respect the Statutory Instrument Order 2000, which enumerates 
circumstances in which sensitive personal data may be processed80 when it is in the 
substantial public interest or when it is necessary for research purposes. This has been 
interpreted to mean that: “Order 2000 specifies that the prohibition [of processing 
sensitive data] is removed where processing is necessary for research purposes that 
are in substantial public interest on condition that the relevant conditions of Section 
33 of the UK Act are satisfied”.81 
Thus, there are three options for secondary use research in UK: i) use of personal data 
with consent or assent from the data subjects; ii) use of anonymised data; iii) use of 
personal data without explicit consent, under a public interest mandate.  
Although the third option appears to be quite simple, it is a question of interpretation 
as to what constitutes “public interest”, which has created some confusion. Some 
researchers have publicly denounced the criterion of an overriding public interest as 
“too ambiguous to be useful” and have urged authorities to specify under which 
circumstances access to personal records without consent should be allowed.82 In 
contrast, the Academy of Medical Science maintains that, should a narrow approach 
be adopted for the interpretation of public interest, it would seriously hamper medical 
research and undermine evidence-based medicine to the detriment of public health.83 
The Wanless Report84 qualified the difficulty obtaining access to data as a “possible 
threat to public health research”. 
One report presented to the Ministry of Justice regarding the use and protection of 
personal information proposes to develop “safe havens” for population-based 
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research, in which the risk of identifying individuals would be minimized.85 To work 
within those environments, researchers should be accredited. The implementation of 
this recommendation will require new legislation. 
In conclusion, ethics norms in all these countries are associated with “nominative 
information” or “identifiable personal data”. By definition, any data still associated 
with anonymized or anonymous samples do not constitute personal information86 
since they are irreversibly unlinked. In fact, anonymization means removing “the link 
between subjects’ identifiers and the unique code” so that it is no longer possible “to 
trace the data and samples back to individual subjects”.87 This measure is 
recommended in a number of international,88 regional89 and national90 legal 
instruments.  
 
However, “if data anonymization seems to be an interesting mechanism in terms of 
releasing the researcher from the responsibility which is imposed on anyone 
manipulating personal information, this mechanism has very little interest with 
regards to population research, especially if the researcher wants to maintain an 
“organic” link with the samples to be analysed.”91  There are many reasons why the 
identification of individuals may be needed: linkage within a database; linkage 
between databases; ensuring comparisons are meaningful; ensuring completeness of 
recruitment; investigation of social factors; analysis of trends over time; and assessing 
the applicability of primary research.92  
To summarize, there are three major barriers in the actual legal frameworks we have 
examined on personal data protection that limit utilization of information for 
populational research: 1) the obligation to re-consent for secondary uses; 2) the 
evaluation by a committee for every change in the primary use including secondary 
uses; and 3) the variation among institutions in the interpretation of the two first 
elements. These barriers are largely attributable to the fact that “there is no 
population-based counterpart to the principle of autonomy and the practice of 
informed consent by individuals”.93 
PART III.   Future Guidance 
Many similarities can be observed amongst the normative frameworks analyzed - all 
apply the OECD principles and most are under revision. In light of our comparative 
analysis, it becomes obvious that these principles have been interpreted restrictively 
by ethics and privacy review boards. The resulting effect is an overemphasis on 
individual consent and privacy. To attenuate the resulting burdens on population-
based research, four recommendations are proposed based on our comparative 
analysis. They could serve to guide both review boards in their evaluation and policy 
makers in their work in the future. 
i)  Allow broad consent for research at the moment of collecting data 
As demonstrated, requiring an explicit consent is an issue in the secondary use of data 
for population research. Fortunately, there is an increasing tendency towards 
openness.94 Both in Germany and in the new Australian guidelines, a broad consent 
approach has been qualified as a “novel model”95 for access for research purposes. 
With a broad consent to the use of coded data, withdrawal is always possible. 
Obtained at the moment of collecting data, broad consent expands the future “primary 
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use” possibilities for population research and attenuates the problems of secondary 
uses for research. 
ii)  Include the scientific necessity and the impracticability criteria 
Each country studied allows secondary uses of personal data based on the ‘necessity’ 
criterion. To date it has been interpreted restrictively, so only specific information is 
accessible and researchers have to request permission for every further use. The 
European Directive 95/46/EC accepted that scientific research is not an incompatible 
secondary use of personal health information. Thus, the obligation of consent can be 
waived if information is used for scientific purpose, and if “despite reasonable efforts, 
it would be impracticable to contact the data subject to seek his consent”.96 Clearly, 
European regulatory authorities recognize the importance of scientific research and 
the context of limited resources in which it exists.  
In Canada, only the federal legislation governing the private sector has recognized the 
criterion of the impracticability of obtaining individual consent.97 The criterion is 
further described in the research guidelines of the Canadian Institutes of Health 
Research, but there is no explicit reference to impracticability in the laws governing 
the public sector, where most of the personal information used for population research 
is stored. The impracticability criterion backed by the scientific compatibility of 
scientific research with primary purposes should underscore and justify an exemption 
from re-consent. 
iii)  Apply proportionality of risks and reasonable identifiability evaluation 
The ‘proportionality principle’ serves to balance privacy rights and health research. It 
can take two forms: operating generally as a guide for ethics committee to evaluate 
research projects98 and specifically as concerns the identifiability of personal 
information.99 Indeed, a recent development in the USA demonstrated that new 
bioinformatic technologies may allow for identifiability even within large data sets.100 
So, putting emphasis on anonymization and de-identification is prone to failure. It 
does not protect the subjects, is not compatible with research practice101 and puts 
enormous burdens on scientists and ethics committees to evaluate the risk of 
identifiability. 
On the risk of identifiability, Working Group 29 on the 1995 European Directive 
proposed a “reasonable criteria”, meaning that “a mere hypothetical possibility to 
single out the individual is not enough to consider the person as ‘identifiable’”.102 
This is an interesting interpretation of the proportionality principle, as an appreciation 
of risk of identification. But since the evaluation of risks and of potential 
identifiability is subject to individual judgement and variation amongst evaluators, it 
is not clear how, in reality, it is going to be applied. Nevertheless, this pragmatic 
interpretation provides new possibilities regarding appreciation of the research 
protocol by ethics and privacy review committees. 
iv)  Focus on agent not content: from privacy to confidentiality 
Many commentators on research ethics have criticized the privacy model of 
regulation. According to Manson and O’Neill, “All of these problems [identifiability, 
secondary uses] are consequences of trying to protect informational privacy by 
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regulating types of informational content, rather than types of action that use 
information.”103  
The two OECD principles (purpose specificity and limited uses) are the origins of the 
normative framework. These principles determined the informational dimension104 of 
privacy rights. Privacy is known to have multiple components105 but two of them are 
particularly relevant to secondary uses of information: 1) control of information; and 
2) secrecy and confidentiality. The first is about the control of the information by the 
research participant himself. From the professional point of view (i.e. the researchers), 
it is a matter of professional integrity to be faithful to the will of the person who gives 
the data and expects that the goals and uses agreed to will be respected. Fidelity is 
then associated with the collection of data or the primary use agreed at the moment of 
consent. Based on the ethical principles of self-determination and autonomy, it leads 
to the requirement of a specific individual consent (re-consent).  
The second is related to the protection of the personal information in the context of a 
professional relationship. Confidentiality, via the professional secret and security 
measures,106 is the expression of that protection. The articulation of these principles is 
summarized in Figure 1. According to this schematization, it seems possible to respect 
both privacy and dignity rights by putting emphasis on confidentiality without the 
burdens associated with a specific control of information. 
 
Figure 1: Scheme of secondary uses of personal data principles 
We observed that a confidentiality model would be a more sustainable approach for 
population-based research. Focusing on ‘agent not content’107 in practical terms 
recognizes a professional duty of confidentiality for researchers, just as it exists for 
nurses, physicians and other professionals under the professional duty of medical 
confidentiality. Combined with security measures, a professional research secret could 
solve the current difficulties regarding population-based projects. As the Australian 
Law Reform Commission stated: “Duties of confidentiality recognise the dignity and 
autonomy of the individual, as well as the public interest in fostering a relationship of 
trust”.108 
The obligation of confidentiality has the advantage of holding “between different 
types of agents, in many different social contexts”.109 But this obligation needs to 
clearly define relationships among parties - the participants and the researchers. On 
the one hand, it is a privilege to access personal information and researchers have to 
treat data with respect. On the other hand, citizens must understand that their personal 
Privacy Right 
Control of Information 
• Consent  
• Fidelity/Integrity 
Secrecy and Confidentiality 
• Security Measures 
• Professional Secrecy 
Dignity Right 
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information represents a valuable resource for scientists working to improve the 
quality of the diagnoses and treatments they receive.  
Conclusion: The complexity of ethical evaluation of the “public interest” 
The need to maintain trust in relation to the use of personal data in the research 
context has been the subject of much discussion. In the context of population research, 
where participants are not only individuals but also members of communities, 
populations and nations, important aspects of ‘numbers’ and ‘representativeness’ are 
intangible elements. They render the evaluation of population-based research by local 
ethics or privacy boards difficult. Scientists have criticized the public-interest notion 
as vague and ambiguous, but it is on precisely this voluntary, imprecise interface that 
the ethical evaluation of research resides. Neither ethics committees, which depend on 
research activity to exist, nor the researcher, that need the ethics imprimato to be 
publicly supported, have an interest in seeing one activity “substantially outweigh” 
the other: it is a question of public trust. Yet, both need to have better tools to 
enunciate the public interests in play. Perhaps these recommendations will help to 
redirect focus on essentials  - agents - instead of concentrating excessively on consent. 
Population research is about the whole; we need to address the ethics in that context. 
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